中国污染物排放配额有偿使用政策费用效果研究

吕志贤; 石广明; 吴雨霏; 李彩艳; 谭峥铮

doi:10.12153/j.issn.1674-991X.20220566

中国污染物排放配额有偿使用政策费用效果研究

doi: 10.12153/j.issn.1674-991X.20220566

1.
湖南省环境保护科学研究院环境与经济研究所
2.
中南林业科技大学环境科学与工程学院

基金项目: 国家自然科学基金项目（41301638）；国家重点研发计划项目（2018YFC0213703）

详细信息

作者简介:
吕志贤(1982—)，女，工程师，硕士，主要从事排污交易等环境经济政策、环境规划及环境管理研究，18754602@qq.com

通讯作者:
石广明(1983—)，男，研究员，博士，主要从事环境经济政策、环境规划及环境管理研究，guangming0424@126.com

中图分类号: X32
计量
- 文章访问数: 245
- HTML全文浏览量: 229
- PDF下载量: 17
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2022-06-05
- 录用日期: 2022-10-09
- 修回日期: 2022-09-28

Study on the cost-effectiveness of paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance in China

1.
Institute of Environment and Economy, Hunan Research Academy of Environmental Sciences
2.
College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Central South University of Forestry and Technology

摘要

摘要:
为研究我国现行的污染物排污权有偿使用政策及环境税政策对排污交易市场费用效果的影响，从排污交易原理出发，分析排污交易、污染物排污权有偿使用及环境税3种环境管理手段促进企业污染物减排的原理。在此基础上设置10个虚拟企业模拟分析不同政策组合的费用效果。结果显示，当排污交易政策为主导时，3种手段并存对企业排污交易结果没有影响，且污染物排污权有偿使用政策和环境税政策在排污交易市场中所起的作用一样，均是压缩了排污交易市场中企业排污权的交易价格，增加了企业的污染物减排成本。若污染物排污权有偿使用价格或环境税税率（或二者之和）超出了原有排污交易市场均衡时企业污染物边际减排成本，则排污交易市场将会出现“失灵”现象，即企业不再寻求开展排污交易，而是缴纳污染物排污权有偿使用费或/和环境税。
- 排污交易 /
- 排污权有偿使用费 /
- 环境税 /
- 费用效果
Abstract:
In order to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance and the environmental tax policy on the emission trading market in China, the principles of promoting enterprise pollutant emission reduction by three environmental management instruments (i.e. emission trading, paid use of pollutant allowance, and environmental tax) were analyzed, based on the principles of emission trading. After that, ten virtual enterprises were set up to simulate and analyze the cost-effectiveness of different policy scenarios. The results showed that the coexistence of three policy instruments had no effect on the emission trading of enterprises when the emission trading policy was dominant. Meanwhile, the role of the paid use policy of pollutant emission allowance and the environmental tax policy in the emission trading market was the same; both could reduce the transaction price of the emission allowance and increase pollutant abatement cost. If the paid use price of pollutant emission allowance or the environmental tax rate (or the sum of both) exceeded the marginal abatement cost of the enterprises when the original emission trading market was balanced, the emission trading market would appear "failure" phenomenon, which meant that the enterprises would no longer seek to carry out the emission trading, but pay the compensated fee for the use of pollutant emission right or the environmental tax (or both).
- emission trading /
- paid use fee of pollutant emission allowance /
- environmental tax /
- cost-effectiveness

HTML全文

图 1 不同政策情景下的企业污染物减排总成本

Figure 1. Total pollutant abatement cost of 10 enterprises under different policy scenarios

下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片

表 1 算例研究初始参数数值

Table 1. Initial parameter value of the case studies t　

编号	${u_i}$	${\alpha _i}$	${e_{0i}}$	${q_i}$
1	180	12	54	100
2	220	15	66	100
3	150	18	45	100
4	155	16	46.5	100
5	280	8	84	100
6	245	8	73.5	100
7	500	7	150	100
8	340	6	102	100
9	230	10	69	100
10	450	7	135	100
总计	2 750	—	825	1 000
注：单位污染物以t为单位当量，表1~表4均同样处理。

下载: 导出CSV

表 2 配额免费发放时排污交易市场均衡的结果

Table 2. Result of emission trading market equilibrium under the condition of free allowance

编号	${u_i}$/t	${e_i}$/t	${ {\rm{TC} }_i}$/元	${p_1} ({u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i})$/元¹⁾	(${u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i}$)/t²⁾
1	180	136.24	38 848.46	−183 887.37	−56.24
2	220	108.99	214 181.6	35 999.29	11.01
3	150	90.82	14 999.99	−133 468.75	−40.82
4	155	102.18	12 787.88	−154 263.97	−47.18
5	280	204.36	254 454.3	−79 649.65	−24.36
6	245	204.36	140 015.0	−194 088.80	−59.36
7	500	233.55	926 059.8	544 239.90	166.45
8	340	272.47	339 272.4	−106 166.83	−32.47
9	230	163.48	157 787.7	−109 469.22	−33.48
10	450	233.55	762 575.1	380 755.40	116.45
总计	2 750	1 750	2 860 982.23	0	0
注：TC_i为市场均衡时企业的污染物减排总成本；1)负值为卖出配额产生的收益；2)负值为卖出配额的数量。

下载: 导出CSV

表 3 配额免费发放时排污交易和环境税政策共同作用下市场均衡的结果

Table 3. Result of emission trading market equilibrium under the condition of free allowance and environmental tax policies

编号	${u_i}$/t	${e_i}/$t	${\rm{TC}}{_i}$/元	${p_1} ({u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i})$/ 元	${p_2} ({u_i} - {e_i})$/ 元	(${u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i}$)/ t
1	180	136.24	39 848.46	−183 324.97	437.6	−56.24
2	220	108.99	215 181.6	35 889.19	1 110.1	11.01
3	150	90.82	15 999.99	−133 060.55	591.8	−40.82
4	155	102.18	13 787.88	−153 792.17	528.2	−47.18
5	280	204.36	255 454.3	−79 406.05	756.4	−24.36
6	245	204.36	141 015	−193 495.20	406.4	−59.36
7	500	233.55	927 059.8	542 575.40	2 664.5	166.45
8	340	272.47	340 272.4	−105 842.13	675.3	−32.47
9	230	163.48	158 787.7	−109 134.42	665.2	−33.48
10	450	233.55	763 575.1	379 590.90	2 164.5	116.45
总计	2 750	1 750	2 870 982.23	0	10 000	0

下载: 导出CSV

表 4 配额有偿使用时排污交易和环境税政策共同作用下市场均衡的结果

Table 4. Result of emission trading market equilibrium under the condition of paid use of allowance and environmental tax policies

编号	$({u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i})$/t	${\rm{TC}}{_i}$/元	${p_1} ({u_i} - {e_i} - $$ {q_i})$/元	${p_2} ({u_i} - {e_i})$/元	${p_3} ({u_i} - {e_i} - {q_i})$/元
1	−56.24	59 848.46	−172 076.97	437.6	8752
2	11.01	235 181.6	33 687.19	1 110.1	22 202
3	−40.82	35 999.99	−124 896.55	591.8	11 836
4	−47.18	33 787.88	−144 356.17	528.2	10 564
5	−24.36	275 454.3	−74 534.05	756.4	15 128
6	−59.36	161 015	−181 623.2	406.4	8 128
7	166.45	947 059.8	509 285.4	2 664.5	53 290
8	−32.47	360 272.4	−99 348.13	675.3	13 506
9	−33.48	178 787.7	−102 438.42	665.2	13 304
10	116.45	783 575.1	356 300.9	2164.5	43 290
总计	0	3 070 982.23	0	10 000	200 000
注：$ {u}_{i} $、$ {e}_{i} $与表3相同。

下载: 导出CSV

参考文献(15)

[1]	王金南. 二氧化硫排放交易: 美国的经验与中国的前景[M]. 北京: 中国环境科学出版社, 2000.
[2]	HLASNY V. SO₂ emission permits tradable under exchange rates: U.S. case[J]. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011. doi: 10.2139/SSRN.2029452.
[3]	TIETENBERG T. Emissions trading: principles and practice[M]. 2nd ed. Washington DC: RFF Press,2006
[4]	WEISHAAR S E. Emissions trading design: a critical overview[M]. Cheltenham, UK Northampton:Edward Elgar Press, 2014.
[5]	冷罗生.日本温室气体排放权交易制度及启示[J]. 法学杂志,2011,32(1):65-68. doi: 10.16092/j.cnki.1001-618x.2011.01.005 LENG L S. Research about Japan's trading system of GHS emission rights and its enlightenment[J]. Law Science Magazine,2011,32(1):65-68. doi: 10.16092/j.cnki.1001-618x.2011.01.005
[6]	王金南, 毕军. 排污交易: 实践与创新: 排污交易国际研讨会论文集[M]. 北京: 中国环境科学出版社, 2009.
[7]	郝春旭, 董战峰, 葛察忠, 等.国家环境经济政策进展评估报告2020[J]. 中国环境管理,2021,13(2):10-15. HAO C X, DONG Z F, GE C Z, et al. National environmental economic policy progress assessment report 2020[J]. Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2021,13(2):10-15.
[8]	易爱军, 杨佃春, 张金保.排污权有偿使用和交易定价问题研究: 以连云港海域化学需氧量排放为例[J]. 价格理论与实践,2016(12):64-67. YI A J, YANG D C, ZHANG J B. Research on the pricing problem of paid use and transaction of emission rights: a case study of chemical oxygen demand in the sea area of Lianyungang[J]. Price:Theory & Practice,2016(12):64-67.
[9]	吴柳芳, 张滨, 冯晓飞, 等.浙江省排污权有偿使用价格的实例研究[J]. 环境科学与管理,2015,40(5):174-177. WU L F, ZHANG B, FENG X F, et al. Case study on pollution rights trading system in Zhejiang Province[J]. Environmental Science and Management,2015,40(5):174-177.
[10]	郭默, 毕军, 王金南.中国排污权有偿使用定价及政策影响研究[J]. 中国环境管理,2017,9(1):41-51. GUO M, BI J, WANG J N. Pricing the payment for initial emission allowance in China[J]. Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2017,9(1):41-51.
[11]	Daniel J Dudek, 秦虎, 张建宇.以SO₂排放控制和排污权交易为例分析中国环境执政能力[J]. 环境科学研究,2006,19(增刊 1):44-58. DUDEK D J, QIN H, ZHANG J Y. Problems and actions of China environmental governance: a case study on SO₂ emission control and emission trade[J]. Research of Environmental Sciences,2006,19(Suppl 1):44-58.
[12]	宋福忠, 李凯旋, 李烨楠, 等.基于模糊数学的排污权交易基准价测算模型及其应用[J]. 环境科学研究,2018,31(1):194-200. SONG F Z, LI K X, LI Y N, et al. A fuzzy mathematics based on pricing model for emissions trading benchmark price and its application[J]. Research of Environmental Sciences,2018,31(1):194-200.
[13]	冯晓飞, 何月峰, 沈海萍.浙江省排污权交易政策实践分析[J]. 环境与可持续发展,2019,44(6):129-131. doi: 10.19758/j.cnki.issn1673-288x.201906129 FENG X F, HE Y F, SHEN H P. Analysis on the policy practice of emission trading in Zhejiang[J]. Environment and Sustainable Development,2019,44(6):129-131. doi: 10.19758/j.cnki.issn1673-288x.201906129
[14]	黄懿, 李庄, 尹福祥, 等.湖南省排污权交易试点工作实践成效与经验探讨[J]. 环境影响评价,2021,43(4):17-23. doi: 10.14068/j.ceia.2021.04.005 HUANG Y, LI Z, YIN F X, et al. Discussion on the practice effect and experience of emission trading scheme (ETS) pilot in Hunan Province[J]. Environmental Impact Assessment,2021,43(4):17-23. doi: 10.14068/j.ceia.2021.04.005
[15]	张志麒, 张保留, 罗宏.工业大气污染治理的环境经济政策体系研究[J]. 环境工程技术学报,2019,9(3):311-319. doi: 10.12153/j.issn.1674-991X.2019.01.140 ZHANG Z Q, ZHANG B L, LUO H. Research on environmental economic policy system of industrial air pollution control[J]. Journal of Environmental Engineering Technology,2019,9(3):311-319. ⊕ doi: 10.12153/j.issn.1674-991X.2019.01.140